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1 Problem Statement
Management believes that it would be beneficial to increase
its current gearing levels. If this strategy were to be
implemented the company would then be financed to a
greater extent by cheaper borrowed funds, resulting in the
weighted average cost of capital (W ACC) to fall .
The discounting of future cash flows at this lower WACC
produces a higher present value and so shareholder wealth is
enhanced.
I, the Financial Director and shareholder, am considering
two long -term loans , one local , and the other from abroad.
The company currently has about 6% financial geanng .
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2 Hypothesis
Ho: The introduction of long-term debt into the Capital
Structure will not lead to a reduction in the weighted
average cost of capital.
H I: The introduction of long-term debt into the Capital
Structure will lead to a reduction in the weighted average
cost of capital.
Maduate School of Business
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3 Literature Review
3 .1. 0 Introduction
Someone has to decide what is the appropriate level of
borrowing for a firm given its equity base. To assist this
decision it would be useful to know if it is theoretically
possible to increase shareholders wealth by changing the
gearing (debt - equity ratio) level. That is, if future cash
flows generated by the business are assumed to be constant,
can managers simply by altering the proportion of debt in
the total capital structure increase shareholder value? If this
is possible then surely managers have a duty to move the
firm towards the optimal debt proportion?
The traditional VIew was that it would be beneficial to
increase gearing from a low (or zero) level because the firm
would then be financed to a greater extent by cheaper
borrowed funds (tax shield impact), therefore the weighted
average cost of capital (WACC) would fall. The discounting
of future cash flows at this lower W ACC produces a higher
present value and so shareholder wealth IS enhanced.
However, as debt levels rise the firm's earm n g s attributable
to shareholders become increasingly volatile due to the
requirement to pay large amounts of interest prior to
di vidends.
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Eventually the burden of a large annual interest bill can lead
to become financially distressed and, In extreme
circumstances, liquidation. So the traditional answer to the
question of whether there was an optimum gearing level was
'yes'. If the gearing level is too low, shareholders value
opportunities are forgone by not substituting 'ch eap ' debt for
equity . If it is too high the additional risk leads to a loss in
shareholder value through a higher discount rate being
applied to the future cash flows attributable to ordinary
shareholders . This is because of the higher risk and, at very
high gearing, the penalty of complete business failure
becomes much more of a possibility .
Then, in the late 1950s a theory was developed by Franco
Modigliani and Merton Miller (1958) which said that it did
not matter whether the firm had a gearing level of 90% debt
or 2% debt - the overall value of the firm is constant and
shareholder wealth cannot be enhanced by altering the debt -
equity ratio. This conclusion was based on some major
assumptions and required the firm to operate in a perfect
world of perfect knowledge, a world in which individual
shareholders can borrow and lend at the same rate as giant
corporations, and in which taxation and cost of financial
distress do not exist.
ricraduate School of Business
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Later Modigliani and Miller modified the no-taxation
assumption . This led to a different conclusion : the best
gearing level for a firm interested in shareholder wealth
maximization is, generally , as high as possible. This was an
astonishing result; it means that a company financed by
£99m of debt and £ 1m of equity serves its shareholders
better than one funded by £50m of debt and £50m of equity.
Within academic circles thousands of hours of thinking and
research has been spent over the past four decades building
on the Modigliani and Miller foundations, and millions of
hours of undergraduates' and postgraduates I precious time
has been spent learning the intricacies of the algebraic proof
lying behind Modigliani and Miller conclusions. Going
through this process has its virtues : the models provide a
systematic framework for evaluating the capital structure
question and can lead to some rigorous thought within the
confines of the models.
3.1.1 The Modigliani - Miller Propositions
One of the pillars on which the field of finance rests are the
Modigliani - Miller proposition on capital structure. Here,
the . tensions between the micro normative and the macro
normative approaches were evident from the outset as is,
clear from the very title of the first Modigliani - Miller
paper, "The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance and the
Theory of Investment."
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The theme of that paper, and indeed of the whole field of
corporate finance at the time, is capital budgeting.
The nu cro normative wrn g was concerned with finding the
"cost of capital" in the sense of the optimal cutoff rate for
investment when the firm can finance the project either with
debt of equity of some combination of both. The macro
normative or ccouo mrcs wrn g sought to express the
aggregate demand for investment by corporations as a
function of the cost of capital that firms are actually u sm g
as their optimal cutoffs, rather than just the rate of interest
on long-term government bonds.
The Modigliani - Miller analysis provided answers, but ones
that left both wings of the profession dissatisfied.
At the macro normative level, the Modigliani and Miller
measure of the cost of capital for aggregate investment
functions never really caught on, and, indeed, the very
notion of estimating aggregate demand functions for
investment has long SInce been abandoned by macro
economists. At the micro level, the Modigliani and Miller
propositions imply that the choice of financing instrument is
irrelevant for the optimal cutoff.
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Such a cutoff s seen to depend solely on the risk (or "risk
class") of the investment, regardless of how it is financed,
hardly a happy position for professors of finance to explain
to their students being trained, presumably, in the art of
selecting optimal capital structures.
Faced with the unpleasant action consequences of the
Modigliani and Miller model at the m t cr o level, the
tendency of many at first was to dismiss the assumption
underlying Modigliani and Miller's then novel arbitrage
proof as unrealistic. The assumption underlying the CAPM,
of course, are equally or even more implausible, as noted
earlier, but the profession seemed far more willing to accept
Friedman's:
"the assumption don't matter"
position for the CAPM the for the Modigliani and Miller
propo si tions.
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The likely reasons is that the second blade of the Friedman
positivism slogan :
"what does count IS the descriptive power of the
model itself,"
was not followed up .
Tests by the hundreds of the CAPM fill the literature . But
direct calibration tests of the Modigliani and Miller
proposition and their implications do not.
One fundamental difficulty of testing the Modigliani and
Miller proposition shows up in the initial Modigliani and
Miller paper itself. The capital structure proposition says
that if you could find two firms whose underlying earnings
are identical, then so would their market value, regardless of
how much of the capital structure takes the form of equity as
opposed to debt.
But how do you find two co mp an re s whose earm n gs are
identical? Modigliani and Miller tried using industry as a
way of holding earnings constant, but this sort of filter is
far too crude . Attempts to exploit the power of the CAPM
for testing Modigliani and Miller were no more successful.
How do you compute a beta for the underlying real assets?
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One way to avoid the difficulty of not having two identical
firms , is to see what happens when the same firm changes
capital structure. If a firm borrows and uses the proceeds to
pay its shareholders a huge dividend or to buy back share,
does the value of the firm increase? Many studies have
suggested that it does. But the interpretation of such results
faces a hopeless identification problem.
The firm, after all, never issues a press release s ay in g "we
are just conducting a purely scientific investigation of the
Modigliani and Miller proposition ." The market, which is
forward-looking , has every reason to believe that the capital
structure decisions are conveying management's views about
changes In the firm's prospects for the future. These
confounding "information effects ," present in every dividend
and capital structure decision , render indecisive all tests
based on specific corporate actions.
Nor can we hope to refute the Modigliani and Miller
propositions indirectly by calling attention to the multitude
of new securities and of variations on old securities that are
introduced year after year. The Modigliani and Miller
propositions say only that no gains could be earned from
such innovations if the market were in fact "complete."
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But the new securities in question may well be se r vm g to
complete the market, earning a first mover's profit to the
particular innovation . Only those on Wall Street know how
hard it is these days to come by those innovator's profits .
If all this reminiscent of the efficient markets hypothesis ,
that is no accident. The Modigliani and Miller propositions
are also ways of saying that there is no free lunch. Firms
cannot hope to gain by issuing what looks like low-cost debt
rather than high-cost debt. They just make the cost of
higher-cost equity even higher. And if any substantial
number of firms, at the same time, seek to replace what they
think is the ir high-cost equity with low-cost debt (even tax-
advantaged debt) , then the interest costs of debt will rise,
and the required yields on equity will fall until the
perceived incentives to change capital structures (or
di vidend po I ic ie s for that matter) are e1imina ted .
The Modigliani and Miller propositions , In short , like the
efficient markets hypothesis , are about equilibrium in the
capital markets , what equilibrium looks like , and what
forces are set in motion once it is disturbed. And this is why
neither the efficient markets hypothesis nor the Modigliani
and Miller propositions have ever set well w ith those in the
profession who see finance as essentially a branch of
management science .
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The following is stated in their proposition:
"The market value of any firm is independent of its
capital structure and IS given by capitalizing its
expected return at the rate p appropriate to its risk
class."
"The average cost of capital to any firm is completely
independent of its capital structure and is equal to the
capitalization rate of a pure equity stream of its
class. "
Copeland and Weston offer their op nu on of the importance
of the Modigliani and Miller Proposition 1.
"This is perhaps the single most important result In
the theory of corporate finance obtained in the last 25
years. It says that in the absence of any market
imperfections including corporate taxes , the value of
the firm is completely independent of the type of
financing used for its projects. In other words , the
method of financing is irrelevant."
G5-.duate School of Business 15
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Of course, there is no such thing as a perfect market.
However, Modigliani and Miller's theory IS generally
believed to apply on a pre-financed pre-tax basis because
income taxes are considered to be the primary market
imperfection. On an after-tax basis, there is an unsettled
academic debate with regards to the cost of capital and
capital structure.
3.1.2 Debt is Good for you
Ever SInce Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller published
their famous papers on the relative merits of debt and equity
financing, the central question in corporate finance has been
about the optimal balance between the two.
Modigliani and Miller argued that, grve n certain
assumptions, the proportions of debt and equity capital were
irrelevant to the value of a firm; the only difference they
made was to the distribution of the spoils between creditors
and shareholders. This was because the more debt a firm
issued for a given level of equity, the riskier that firm
became. Leverage Increases the expected return to
shareholders, but it also increases their risks. In an efficient
stock market, the two should cancel each other out.
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But a later, modified version of the Modigliani and Miller
theory said something rather different. It allowed for the
fact that the original assumptions, particularly on taxation,
might not apply. In America, dividends are paid out of
companies' net-of-tax income, and are then taxed a.gam In
the hands of the recipients. Interest payments on debt, on
the other hand, are tax-deductible.
This means that a firm's overall value should increase as it
substitutes debt for equity, and suggests that many firms in
the 1950s and 1960s had too much equity and not enough
debt.
However, it IS clear that over the past couple of decades
they have been trying to rectify that. But not, perhaps, as
vigorously as might be expected. As Modigliani and Miller
proposition implied that firms should be financed almost
entirely with debt. Yet many big companies still think that
their weighted average cost of capital, the total mix of debt
and equity, would be cheaper in the long term if they
maintained a solid credit rating. Clearly, piling up more
debt benefits shareholders only up to a point. That point,
roughly speaking, is reached when bondholders are so
worried about the company defaulting that the cost of its
debt rises to unsustainable levels. To go on borrowing
beyond that point may even lead to bankruptcy.
Grllduate School of Business 17
MBA Research Dissertation, Capital Structure
Note that bankruptcy in America is rather less onerous to
shareholders than it is in many other big economies.
Moreover, inflation, both in America and elsewhere, is much
less of a problem than it was in the 1970s and early 1980s ,
so interest rates are lower and companies can afford to
borrow more . Some commentators, notably Stern Stewart, a
consultant , that does a lot of work in this area, maintains
that many firms still have too little debt.
Mature, profitable firms, with the least need to borrow ,
probably benefit most from doing so.
Consider three different capital structures which will all
result in £ 1Om of capital being raised.
1. All equity - 10 million shares sold at a nominal value of
£1.
2. £3m debt (carrying 10% interest) and £7m equity.
3. £5m debt (carrying 10% interest) and £5m equity .
Probabilities of performance levels
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We can now examine what will happen to shareholder
returns for each of the gearing levels.
The effect of gearing (taxes to be ignored)
Customer response Modest Good Run-away
Earnings before interest 0.5rn 3rn 4rn
All-equity structure
Debt interest at 10% 0 0 0
Earnings available for shareholders 0.5 3 4
Return on shares 5% 30% 40%
30% Gearing (3m debt, 7m equity)
Debt interest at 10% 0.3 0.3 0.3
Earnings available for shareholders 0.2 2.7 3.7
Return on shares 3% 39% 53%
50% Gearing (5rn debt, 5rn equity)
Debt interest at 10% 0.5 0.5 0.5
Earnings available for shareholders 0 2.5 3.5
Return on shares 0% 50% 70%
3.1.3 A Matter of Degree
Two other theories try to explain why firms are still
reluctant to incur debt, or at least do not borrow as much as
implied by the Modigliani and Miller theory. The first,
called the trade-off theory, says that the amount of debt a
firm is willing to take on depends, among other things, on
the business it IS in. Profitable companies with stable cash
flows and safe, tangible assets can afford more de b t ;
unprofitable, risky ones with intangible assets, rather less.
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So dot.com c omp am e s , to take a formerly
sector , would be ill advised to shoulder any
Firms in highly cyclical industries, such as
should probably be wary of taking on too much.
fashionable
debt at all .
car making,
By contrast, utilities, whose business tends to be more
predictable, can afford much greater leverage .
Managers prefer this kind of theory to the Modigliani and
Miller one because it does not imply categorically that they
are doing the wrong thing. But does it give them much
guidance on what, in fact , they should be doing? Some
would argue that in a way it does ; that firms "target" a
credit rating they are happy with, according to the business
they are in , and stick to it.
Rick Escherich, an analyst at l.P . Morgan, has looked at a
sample of 50 companies taken from Fortune magazine's list
of "most admired companies ," and found that only four of
them have been downgraded by more than one notch over the
past ten years. Most of them have the same rating now as
they did a decade ago.
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But Stephen Kealhofer of KMV says that , according to his
firm's research , firms do not target credit ratings , indeed
quite the opposite:
"We find that firms engage In anti-targeting
behavior. "
Generally, they are more interested In their business plans
than in what the rating agencies say . If they get into trouble,
they increase their liabilities to enable them to carry out
these plans, as the telecoms firms done.
"Only when they get close to default do they reduce
them," he points out.
3 .1.4 Agency Costs
Another restraining influence on the decision to take on high
debt is the agency cost of doing so. Agency costs arise out
of what is known as the "principal-agent" problem . In most
large firms the finance providers (principles) are not able to
actively manage the firm. The y employ "agents" (managers)
and it is possible for these agents to act in ways which are
not always in the best interest of the equity or debt holders.
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If we focus on the debt issue and assume that there is no
potenti a l confl i ct of intere st between shareho I ders and
management, we can assume that management are acting for
the maximization of shareholder wealth. But debt holders
may have reason to fear agency problems, because there may
be actions which potentially benefit the owners at the
expenses of lenders. It is possible for lenders to be fooled or
mislead by managers .
For example, management might rai se money from bond
holders saying that this is low-risk (and therefore paying a
low in t er e s t rate) because the firm has low gearing and the
funds will be used for low-risk project. In the event the
managers invest in high-risk venture, and the firm becomes
highly geared by borrowing more.
As a result the . original lenders do not r e ce i ve a return
sufficient for the level of risk and the firm has the benefit of
low-interest financing . Alternatively, consider a firm
already in financial distress.
From the shareholders' point of VIew there IS little to lose
taking an enormous gamble by accepting very high risk
projects. If the gamble pays off the shareholders will WIn
but the debt holders will gain no more then the obligated
fixed interest. If it fails, the shareholders are no worse off
but the lenders experience default on their securities.
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The problem boils down to one of information asymmetry -
that IS, the managers are In p os se ss i on of knowledge
unavailable to the debt providers . One of the solutions is to
spend money on monitoring . The lenders will require a
premr urn on the debt interest to compensate for this
additional cost. Also restrictions (covenants) are usually
built into a lending agreement. For example, there may be
limits on the level of dividends so that shareholders do not
strip the company of cash.
There may be limits placed on the overall level of
indebtedness , with precrse capital and income-gearing
ratios. Mangers may be restricted in the disposal of major
assets or constrained in the type of activity they may engage
In.
Extensive covenants imposed by lenders can be costly for
shareholders because they reduce the firm's operating
freedom and investment flexibility. Projects with a high
NPV may be forgone because of the cautiousness of lenders .
The opportunity costs can be especially frustrating for firms
with high growth potential. Thus agency costs include
monitoring costs passed on as higher interest rates and the
loss of value caused by the inhibition of managerial freedom
to act. These increase with gear in g , r ars m g the implicit cost
of de bt and lowering the firm's val ue.
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There may also be a psychological element related to agency
costs; managers generally do not like restrictions placed on
their freedom of action. They try to limit constraints by not
rai s m g a large proportion of capital from lenders . This may
help to explain why , In practice, we find c omp am es
generally have modest gearing levels .
Borrowing capacity has a close connection with agency
costs . Lenders prefer secured lending , and this often sets an
upper limit on gearing.
They like to have the assurance that if the worst happened
and the firm was unable to meet its interest obligations they
could seize assets to sell off in order that loans could be
repaid .
Thus, high levels of gearing are unusual because co mp ant es
run out of suitable assets to offer as security against loans.
So, the ge arm g level may not be determined by a
theoretical, informed and considered manager decision, but
by the limits to total borrowing imposed by lenders.
Firms with assets which have an active secondhand market ,
and which do not tend to depreciate, such as property , are
likely to have higher borrowing capacity than firms that
invest in assets with few alternative uses.
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Liquidity affects not only shareholder, but managers and
other employees. Indeed , the impact on these people can be
far greater than the impact on well-diversified investors . It
may be argued that managers have a natural tendency to be
cautious are borrowing .
Mr. Kealhofer prefers a third explanation of firms' behavior,
dubbed "the pecking-order theory." The central plank of this
theory, first propounded by Stewart Meyers in 1984, is that
outside investors in a firm know less about the health of a
firm than its managers do.
That can be a problem when the company wants to Issue
equity: investors may believe, rightly or wrongly, that the
company is doing this because it thinks its shares are
overpriced, and may respond by selling them .
Issuing debt generally has a much less dramatic effect , but
external finance is still cos tl y . That is why the vas t maj ori ty
of new capital raised by firms comes from retained profits.
The pecking-order theory might help to explain why many
big firms hold large reserves. If they find that these are
insufficient , they often take another route: to delay paying
their bills .
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In effect, when they need to borrow, the first place they
look to is their trade creditors. Onl y when that route
becomes difficult do they turn to external lenders , banks or
bond market, and only as a last resort to the equity markets .
That might help to explain why companies with stable
profits often borrow a lot less than unprofitable ones. The
pecking order of finance IS In sharp contrast to the
Modigliani and Miller theory plus financial distress
analysis, in which an optimal capital structure is targeted.
Myers (1984, p.581) puts it in this way :
"In thi s story, there 1s no we ll-defined tar get de bt-
equity mix, because there are two kinds of equity,
internal and external, one at the top of the pecking
order and the one at the bottom."
One reason for placing new issues of equity at the bottom is
supposedly that the stock markets perceive an equity issue
as a sign of problems - an act of desperation . Myers and
Majluf (1984) provide a theoretical explanation of why an
equity issue might be bad news - managers will only issue
shares when they believe the firm's shares are overpriced.
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Bennett Stewart (1990, p .39l) puts it differently :
"Raising equity conveys doubt. Investors suspect that
management is attempting to shore up the firm's
financial resources for rough times ahead by selling
over-valued shares ."
The pecking order idea helps to explain why the most
profitable companies often borrow very little . It is not that
they have a low target debt ratio, but because they do not
need outside finance. If they are highly profitable they will
use these profits for growth opportunities and so end up
with very little debt and no need to issue shares.
Less profitable firms issue debt because they do not have
internal funds sufficient for their capital investment
program and because debt is first in the pecking order of
externally raised finance . There is an argument that firms do
not try to reach the "correct" capital structure as dictated by
theory, because managers are following a line of least
res is tance.
Internal funds are the first choice because USIng retained
earnings does not involve contact with outside investors.
This avoids the discipline involved in trying to extract
investors'money.
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For example, the communication process required to r a r se
equity finance is usually time-consuming and onerous , w ith
formal prospectus, etc ., and investors will scrutinize the
detailed justifications advanced for the need to r a is e
additional finance . It seems reasonable to suppose that
managers will feel more comfortable using funds they have
in their hands. However, if they do have to obtain external
financing then debt is the least line of resistance . This is
because the degree of questioning and publicity associated
with a bank loan or bond issue is usually significantly less
than that associated with a share issue .
Another reason for a pecking order is that ordinary shares
are more expensive to issue than debt capital , which in turn
IS more expensive than simply applying previously generated
profits. The cost of new issues and rights issues of shares
can be very exp ensrve, whereas retained earm n g s are
available without transaction costs.
Yet none of these theories gives much of a clue to whether,
at any particular point , firms' debts are too high or too low.
To put it another way, they do not tell you what the market
thinks of a firm's defaul t risk. For that, turn to another
theory , which despite its less-than-snappy title has lately
proven remarkably powerful: contingent claims analysis.
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This was first developed by Robert Merton, an economist
who in 1997 won a N obel prize with Myron Scholes for his
work on developing mathematical models to price options. It
uses option theory to analyze the differing claims that debt-
holders and shareholders have on a firm .
3.1.5 Ma king Money by Defa uIt
The theory says that shareholders essentially own a call
option on the firm. (the right but not the obligation to buy)
Shareholders get all the upside; their downside, thanks to
limited liability, is restricted to the firm going bankrupt.
The position of bondholders, by contrast , is that of someone
having sold a put option (the right to sell) to shareholders,
conferring on them the right to bankrupt the firm .
The bondholders' main upside is the fee they receive for that
option, for example, the interest on the loans they make to
the firm. The theory IS helpful In analyzing the market's
view of a company's creditworthiness: the more likely it
thinks a firm is to default, the greater the fee, it will charge.
KMV has built a business applying this theory to estimate
the likelihood of a firm defaulting . Some investment banks
are increasingly turning to it. Even Moody's has developed
its own version.
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KMV's model has three main elements : how much a firm
owes; how valuable the business is (using the equity price as
an indicator); and the volatility of that business (which can
also be deducted from the equity price.) Surprisingly,
although the equity market did splendidly in 1999 and early
last year, its median estimates default frequencies (EDFs, a
measure of the likelihood of default) for the 10,000 North
American companies tracked by the consultant carried on
rising. In recent months, they have risen still further , and
some firms have done worse than others.
If that seems odd, consider a slightly more refined way of
looking at the put option that debt holders have sold to
shareholders. It is, in fact, a put option whose strike price IS
a long way below the current price of a firm's equity.
As a firm's share fall to a level where the equity pr t ce , and
by extension the net assets of the firm, get close to a firm's
liabilities, the firm IS In increasing danger of becoming
insolvent. That makes the put option worth a lot more, so
the yield on the company's debts rises .
The share pr t ce s of most firms, particularly those with an
investment grade, are nowhere near this level. But this is
where a key feature of option pricing comes In. Option
markets do not guess the direction that as asset's price is
heading in; instead, they look at its volatility.
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The more volatile an asset, the greater the chance that an
option written on it will be exercised. Put another way, the
more volatile a share, the less happy bond investors will be
to lend to it. If the firm's shares become so volatile that
insolvency is at least possible, the yield demanded by debt
holders will rise, perhaps dramatically.
There is a further wrinkle. When the bondholder sells the
put option to a firm's shareholders, the strike price (at which
the option can be exercised) is not set in s to n e ; it is
variable. That is, the managers of the firm could reduce debt
(which is helpful for bondholders because, in effect, it
reduces the strike price at which a company becomes
insolvent); it could Increase debt (the opp o site): it could
sell shares (good), or it could buy them back (bad).
The point to note IS that bondholders sell managers not only
the right to bankrupt the firm, but also the right to alter the
finn's capital structure. Arcane as all this might sound, it
helps in understanding what has been happening in the
corporate bond market this past year or so.
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3.1 .6 Modigliani and Miller on Capital Structure
"Our distinction between the real value of the firm and
its financial packaging raised many Issues long
familiar to economists in discussions of the 'money
illusion' and money neutrality ."
So wrote Merton Miller (1988 , p .100) in his contribution
marking the thirtieth anniversary of the publication of the
celebrated Modigliani and Miller propositions on capital
structure (Modigliani and Miller, 1958) .
The institution that gave r i se to this paper was that so open
an avowal of the neutral-money doctrine must be vulnerable
to challenge on the grounds on which Post Keynesian's have
disputed it in the general macroeconomic case . These are
that, in a monetary production economy operating under
conditions of intractable uncertainty and in which firms and
households constitute categorically different functional
entities, money contracts have a um qu e and positive
influence and that th is is true whether markets are perfect or
imperfect.
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Miller (1988, p .10l) tells how the Modigliani and Miller:
"approach of looking through the momentary capital
structure to the underlying real flows"
was inspired by the way financial assets and liabilities , and
with them the debt / equity ratio, disappeared entirely from
the reckoning when sectoral balance sheets are consolidated
into national accounts. The present discussion focuses
specifically on what , inter-alia, is lost in this aggregation ,
namely, the essentially financial role of lenders and their
crucial influence, as a matter both of analysis and historical
record, on the gearing decision .
The broad argument IS that lenders' preferences set upper
and lower bounds to the gearing levels at which firms will
operate. The upper limit is directly imposed by lenders . The
lower bound emerges because the nature of the firm makes
lenders willing to provide it with finance on more favorable
terms than they would offer to an individual borrower. Firms
are t h er e for e encouraged to take on debt and In fact set
target debt ratios within the bounds determined by lenders'
behavior.
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The following is devoted to establishing the theoretical case
for the existence of the postulated upper bound to the
gearing ratio . The starting point, in the next sect ion, is an
analysis of the Modigliani and Miller vision of bankruptcy.
This is shown to be more than a parody of reality in which
the economy is populated solely by "sound concerns," but,
equally, it proves to be an essential element In the
Modigliani and Miller extension of the neutral money thesis
to encompass corporate capital structures . The paper then
proceeds to trace the or i gm s of this conception of
bankruptcy to the Modigliani and Miller application of the
stochastic paradigm that dominates financial theory and the
way it enables them to portray risk as a phenomenon
stemming from imperfections that may contingently arise
within the economic world the firms inhabits , rather than
from the uncertain nature of that world itself.
Via reference to work by Davidson (1982-1983), Vickers
(1992), and Crotty (1992) , familiar Keynesian criticism of
the stochastic paradigm are reviewed and shown to apply
specifically to the Modigliani and Miller treatment of
uncertainty . The discussion takes this critique further by
suggesting that no satisfactory understanding of risk , quite
apart from uncertainty, can be derived from the stochastic
world-view , which depicts events as merely ephemeral
accidents.
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It argues that an alternative analysis emphasizing causation
and its corollary, change within historic time, is required.
The logic of this approach IS then applied to explore the
concept of risk (or fear) of irrecoverable loss , which, it is
suggested, offers the key to understanding the determination
of maximum gearing levels as well as the causes of
bankruptcy. Both become explicable as liquidity preference
behavior on the part of creditors .
The penultimate section makes the case for the existence of
a lower bound to the gearing level at which the firm will
operate. While recognizing that excessive gearing implies
risks to firms themselves that they will wish to avoid , their
position of economic "fixity," dictated by their nature as
productive entities, endows them with a general kind of
creditworthiness that they will wish to exploit.
The target gearing ratio emerges as a practical response to
these conflicting considerations , and the analysis , it IS
claimed, throws light on a number of salient "facts of capital
structure" that defy explanation in orthodox terms.
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The conclusion focuses on the implication of the discussion
as a whole : Corporate capital structures observed in the real
world are to be understood in terms not of imperfections
that impede the operation of market forces, but as the
product of essential features of the environment in which
these forces operate .
This in turn implies that Gordon concedes too much when he
states that:
"The Modigliani and Miller theorem IS true to
perfectly competitive capital markets (PC CM) because
the assumptions of PCCM make personal leverage a
perfect substitute for corporate leverage" (1992 ,
p.430).
PCCM will not by themselves dissuade lenders from setting
maximum gearing ratios or favoring corporate over personal
borrowers. Consequently, Modigliani and Miller arbitrage
does not combine with PC CM to represent a sufficient
condition for money neutrality.
To achieve this , two further palpably preverce assumptions
have to be made ; (1) that the stochastic paradigm holds, and
(2) that firms are not operating in a position of "fixity"
within a monetary production economy .
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At the beginning of his article , M iller asserts (p .99) that :
"Our Proposition 1 ... is accepted as an implication of
equilibrium in perfect capital markets ."
3.1.7 Multinational Corporations and their Capital
Structures
An important decision that a Multinational Corporation
(MNC) must take is whether to use the parent firm's cost of
capital or the subsidiary 's in evaluating a project. From a
normative viewpoint, the corporate wide weighted average
cost of capital (WACC) should be utilized in decision
making. Capi tal that is raised locally should merely fit into
the total package of sources of financing that is available to
the firm worldwide. Once the worldwide WACC IS
determined, adjustments can be made to take into account
the risk of a particular country or proj ect , or from a
portfo li 0 pers pecti ve, to take in to cons idera tion the
interaction between the project and the total composition of
investments.
In the current study, 53.8% of the respondents indicated
they used corporate wide WACC as the baseline for
investments.
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This is a slight movement towards the normative from the
Stanley and Block study in 1983 , in which 49% of the
respondents used the firm's cost of capital rather than an
affiliate's cost of capital within a given country . However ,
any movement towards the normative is disappointedly slow .
A related question asked whether the subsidiary's capital
structure should conform to the MNCs worldwide capital
structure. Thi s is a val id ques ti on re gardl ess of whose
WACC is used in evaluating investments. Assume a foreign
subsidiary in Germany represents 2% of the capital mix of
the D.S. parent. Should the foreign firm be asked to conform
to the capital mix of the parent, which might be 300/0 debt,
10% preferred stock and 60% equity?
Only 190/0 of the respondents deemed it necessary for the
foreign affiliate to adhere to the parent company's
percentage composition. This viewpoint was generally true
regardless of whether the affiliate used corporate wide
W ACC or affiliated / project specific cost of capital.
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The emphasis on structuring the affiliate capital structure to
conform to local conditions can be traced to a number of
factors as indicated by the responses to an open-ended
question. Local customs may dictate the appropriate amount
of debt or equity in the capital structure . Furthermore, some
foreign governments require a certain percentage of equity
to ensure the permanence of the parent's commitment, or
conversely , to enable local investors to have an ownership
interest.
Also, competitive conditions associated with other local
companies may dictate an acceptable norm for the capital
structure. Likewise , low interest loans may be available to a
foreign affiliate only through government agencies.
Management of foreign exchange exposure may further
influence the local capital structure. Tax exposure and
repatriation of funds are other considerations. The ultimate
threat of expropriation of property may also be reduced /
incurred by the nature of the local company's capital
structure.
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While over 80% of the respondents to this study said the
local capital structure should not conform to the corporate
wide capital structure, there is still a belief that MNCs
should synchronize the activities of their subsidiaries.
Particularly for those firms that use corporate wide WACC,
there was almost unanimous agreement (96.6%) that the
activities of the subsidiaries should be monitored to ensure
that corporate wide targets are met.
Much of the discussion thus far of worldwide W ACC has
pertained to the influence of country norms. Others would
suggest that industry norms are of equal or greater
importance. Proponents of the later include Bowen, Daley
and Huber, Eurrunza, Ferri and Jon e s, and Sekely and
Collins.
Their argument is that regardless of what country a firm is
in, industry norms will have a strong influence on capital
structure. Firms that have ownership positions in real estate
or that provide bank finance are likely to have high debt
regardless of the country of origin. Similarly, companies
that provide computer software and other MIS services may
be primarily supported by equity regardless of what part of
the world they are in.
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Nevertheless , 680/0 of the respondents said country of origin
was more important than industry in determining WACC,
26% viewed industry as more influential and 6% had no
op mro n .
3.1 .8 Symposium Corporation continues strengthening of
its Capital Structure
Symposium Corporation, a cross media direct marketing
company , today announced that it greatly strengthened the
capital structure of the company by the redemption /
c onv er s i on of all of the Series B Convertible Preferred
Stock and the favorable modification of the conversion
terms of the Series C Preferred Stock.
In response to an offer made by the company in June of this
year, all the outstanding shares of the Series B Convertible
securities were either redeemed or converted into common
stock. Since the conversion price of the preferred was $2 .00
per share , the p oten tial ne gati ve future dil u ti ve imp act of
this conversion feature has been eliminated. Today, there
are current approximately 28 million common shares
outstanding.
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Additionally, the holders of the Series C Preferred shares
have agreed to reduce the shares issuable upon c o nv ers to n
from a maximum of approximately 24 million to
approximately 7.5 million shares.
Ronald Altbach, CEO of the company , commenting on the
restructuring said,
"This significant streamlining of our capital structure
contains two very important messages for our
sharehol ders. Firstly, it clearly shows the confidence
level of our principal investors In the company's
business model and our implementation SInce our
acquisition of DSI In January 2000. It also
significantly limits future dilution and therefore
creates greater potential value for our common
stockholders. "
3 .1.9 Money Neutrality and the Peculiarities of the
Modigliani and Miller Treatment of Bankruptcy
In the post Modigliani and Miller orthodoxy, the putative
risks to shareholders associated with costs of bankruptcy
plays a major role .
4ihlduate School of Business 42
MBA Research Dissertation, Capital Structure
Modigliani and Miller recognize the possibility of such
costs in a footnote where they state: Once we relax the
assumption that all bonds have certain yields , our arbitrage
operator faces the danger of something comparable to
"gambler 's ruin."
That is, there is always the possibility that an otherwise
sound concern might be forced into liquidation as a result of
a run of temporary losses .
Since reorganization involves costs we might expect heavily
levered companies to sell at a slight discount relative to less
heavily indebted companies of the same class. It falls to
writers of financial texts to try to present this speculation in
ways that will make sense to their readers.
A pair of examples will prove instructive.
Puxty and Dodds (1991 , p.298) state:
"The continuity of that [tax] shield is removed by the
presence of. .. financial risk .. .It is not gearing per se
which is the real culprit here: rather it is the cyclical
nature of the earnings which cannot support the
gearing, and earlier we referred to the switch between
financial surplus and deficit of the whole sector that
can occur within a year."
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Notice here how allusion to the economic cycle appears to
add plausibility to the Modigliani and Miller inspired
conception of bankruptcy by offering one readily
understandable reason why earnings may be variable and
years of poor results may bunch together.
Levy and Sarnat, on the other hand, offer a thought
experiment which, they imply , captures the very essence of
bankruptcy costs. In very telling fashion, they make it
possible to have bankruptcy costs without bankruptcy.
"By increasing its use of leverage ," they write, "the
firm also increases its financial risk and thereby the
probability of financial failure. Fortunately, the
probability of bankruptcy and its impact on financial
decision making can be incorporated by utilizing a
convenient hypothesis device ."
"Suppose that each year the firm insure(s) itself
against the possibility of bankruptcy. Such an
arrangement implies that the insurance company w i l l
pay the interest (and other fixed charges) in years In
which losses are sustained. This assumption allows us
to retain the Modigliani and Miller assumption of no
bankruptcy while also reflecting the costs of avoiding
this risk." (1978 , pp .234-236)
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Perhaps the last word on financial failure a la Modigliani
and Miller should be left to Miller himself, who
demonstrates perfect consistency with his earlier writings
and those of other writers cited when he notes, (1998, p.113)
"A run of very bad years might actually find a highly
levered firm unable to meet its debt-service
requirements, precipitating thereby any of the several
processes of recontracting that go under the general
name of bankruptcy. These renegotiations can be
costly indeed to the debtor's estate."
These statements share some CUflOUS but apparently
unnoticed features which we now enumerate :
1. The focus on bankruptcy costs and not on bankruptcy per
se. The event of bankruptcy is treated as incidental and
one that holds no fear for any of the interested parties .
Only the costs that may follow in its wake are seen to
matter.
2 . The presentation of bankruptcy as typically a p as sm g
phase, albeit one that may carry costs with it.
"0 death, where is thy sting?" (1 Cor 15:55)
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3 . The suggestion that bankruptcy costs, when they are
incurred, fall exclusively on shareholders. Bankruptcy,
even if arising only in a world in which bond yields are
uncertain, carries no threats for debt holders' wealth .
4. The reduction of the phenomenon of bankruptcy to a set
of processes of recontracting and its depiction as a cause
of subsequent problems (in that it positively worsens
shareholders' prospects) not as a consequence, much less
the culmination, of an earlier history of them .
5. And finally, and most important, the interpretation of
bankruptcy as a matter of bad luck, such as could happen
to any firm.
Certainly, something akin to "gambler's ruin" can befall
firms: Fluctuations In earm n gs , arrsrn g from cyclical
downturns or any other cause, do not occ as t on create
financial difficulties on a scale that threatens their
continued existence. Nevertheless, there IS something
distinctly odd about this characterization of bankruptcy as a
contingency affecting, to repeat the Modigliani and Miller
phrase, otherwise sound concerns, so sound in fact that they
could in theory afford to insure against this risk.
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The main objection here is that the bankruptcy of the
basically sound enterprise is treated, by default, as the sole
possibility since the sound enterprise is the only case
orthodox theorists seem prepared to consider. And, within
this idiosyncratic framework, all the peculiar features of the
orthodox account acquire a kind of logic:
If the firm is basically sound, bankruptcy must be a matter
of bad luck, an unfortunate random episodic event, a cause
rather than a consequence of problems.
If the firm is basically sound, there is no reason why
bankruptcy should be more than a transitory phase and a
good prospect that it will be a reasonable bloodless affair.
Furthermore, if any blood is spilled, it will always be that of
shareholders. The assets are sound . Why should lenders
suffer?
However, all this amounts to passing the merely possible off
as the norm. In the real world, bankruptcy primarily
represents the fate of unsound concerns, the outcome of an
often protracted and inexorable downward spiral in the
affairs of a company rather than simply a symptom of a bad
patch it is going through, the culmination of preexisting
problems and not the first cloud on the horizon.
(;tllduate School of Business 47
MBA Research Dissertation, Capital Structure
Since that is so, the conception of bankruptcy as an
affliction of sound concerns must be a caricature and the
analysis based on it no more than a parody .
What could have induced such a selective and distorted way
of looking at the world?
Pike and Neale offer an important clue when they observe
(1993 , p .362) that:
"It may seem surprising ... that Modigliani and Miller
should have omitted liquidation costs from their
analysis, but this was a logical consequence of their
perfect capital market assumptions . In such a market
the resale value of assets, even those being sold in a
liquidation, will reflect their true economic values as
measured by the present values of their future income
flows. In other words, the mere event of insolvency is
irrelevant, except insofar as it involves a change of
ownership ."
If markets are perfect, bankruptcy is a matter of supreme
irrelevance . It follows logically that the same is true of the
level of gearing at which the firm operates. Both, by
implication, matter only under imperfect markets. Here we
have it. With this VISIon of bankruptcy and in a perfect
market, money is neutral.
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But if Pike and Neale are unaware that Modigliani and
Miller did in fact refer to bankruptcy costs in their original
article, they seem equally oblivious of the premise of that
discussion: the sound firm suffering temporary losses .
Be this as it may, it is the restriction of the analysis to
sound firms only that makes possible the neutral-money
conclusion implicit in their discussion and explicit In
Modigliani and Miller. This restriction , however, introduces
logical difficulties of its own .
Suppose a firm has experienced a string of poor earm n gs
figures, as a result of which it faces difficulties in meeting
lenders' claims . The institution of insolvency proceedings
would then be the creditors' prerogative. But why, in a
perfect capital market, should creditors of an "otherwise
sound" company ever be induced to go down this road? They
would know that the current difficulties faced by the
company had no implications for the market value of their
claims and that it was simply experiencing the downside , ex
hypothesi temporary , of a volatile situation.
And should this situation have ar ise n at a time when
individual creditors needed cash , they could realize funds
without loss either by selling their claims on the firm or by
borrowing on the strength of them.
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In a perfect market, bankruptcy would not only be
irrelevant, it would be irrational.
In fact, even as summg that markets are imperfect does little
to improve the coherence of the orthodox account.
In an imperfect capital market, forcing a company into
liquidation might represent the only means open to creditors
to realize their wealth . Yet taking such a step would do
nothing to increase that wealth, given the premise that the
company is "otherwise sound ." That creditor should take
action of this kind would therefore be inexplicable unless it
were also assumed that they were facing liquidity problems
of their own , for example , that they too were financially
distressed. But lenders, too , would presumable be "sound
concerns" and the puzzle of why bankruptcy should ever
occur would then just be shifted one stage further down the
line.
In the end, therefore, the Modigliani and Miller theory is
trapped in a logical dilemma: If the firm is sound, why
should bankruptcy ever occur? But if it might not be sound,
what are the grounds for claiming that money is neutral and
gearing irrelevant?
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3.2 .0 Gearing Down
The balance sheet of British business has passed through a
truly remarkable transformation over the past two years .
Statistics and anecdotal evidence In every sector and at
every level from giant household names down to modest
seven-figure enterprises all confirm the pattern: gear m g
levels radically reduced businesses managing their cash flow
more intelligently than ever before and deep-seated
reluctance to borrow afresh.
In many respects this is a positive story. Companies are
emerging from recession in impressive shape having learned
the lesson of sound financial management through bitter
expenence. But this raises three interesting questions.
Firstly, will the caution now being displayed by many
British co mp aru es cause them to mISS investment
opportunities and allow foreign competitors to reap the
benefits of economic recovery? Second, what will the banks
now rediscovering their enthusiasm for corporate lending -
do with their money? And third, should analysts tear up
traditional balance sheet ratios and find new ways of
assessing relative corporate creditworthiness?
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The big picture is provided by Bank of England statistics
which show that industrial and commercial companies have
been repaying debt steadily since the beginning of 1993.
The net reduction for the seven quarters up to September
1994 was £ 7 billion.
New financing was provided instead by a combination of
capital issues (£ 16 billion) and retained earnings which rose
by 3 % in 1993 and began 1994 at double the level of the
worst period of recession. Helped by lower nominal interest
rates since the pound fell out of the ERM interest costs fell
by more than a third between 1990 and 1994. The crucial
ratio of income gearing (interest costs net of profits) across
the corporate spectrum has halved from over 30 % to about
15% today.
Ratios of debt to equity which is important for large
c omp aru es seeking to maintain formal credit ratings or
comply with syndicated loan covenants have improved by
30-40% since the peck of the lending extravaganza. A
survey by accountants KPMG of 133 quoted companies In
West Midlands shows the average debt / equity ratio falling
between 1992/3 and 1993/4 from 32% and 23%. Within those
figures the biggest percentage reduction in gearing (37%)
was in companies with market capitalization of £ 100 million
plus.
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These quantum changes in gearing levels have been achieved
despite a policy shift which has had the opposite effect on
some big companies balance sheets: this was the decision by
the Accounting Standards Board to take a tougher line on
the classification of impermanent hybrid securities as debt
rather than equity.
Clever City inventions such as the auction market preferred
share and the convertible capital bond were re-bracketed as
liabilities affecting a variety of major companies from
British Airways to Reckitt & Colman. Creative accounting is
now very much yesterday's game .
Attitudes of straightforward prudence now apply both to
capital investment and to working capital financing. In both
respects, the quelling of inflation to almost negligible levels
of 1-2 % per annum is a new factor.
Without inflation, real costs of borrowing and rates of
return are theoretically plainer to compare. Without
inflation, real costs of borrowing and rates of return are
theoretically plainer to compare.
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Economists argue that senous long-term investment IS
thereby encouraged, but many smaller businessmen are
deterred by the rigorous nature of the calculation involved :
in crude terms investment was easier in the old days because
term debt was easier to repay as inflation acted to diminish
it while boosting the residual v a lue of the asset financed.














































Equity gearing ratio = Total borrowings net of cash
Share capital plus reserves
Source : KPMG West Midlands plc annual report
Absence of inflation In working capital requirements also
reduces demand for overdraft financing. But more
importantly, so also do the struc tural changes which have
taken place as a result of the rec e ss ron, In the way
businesses manage their cash flow.
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According to J ennings, Director of Commercial Marketing at
National Westminster Bank, there has been a "major shift In
business literacy," in which managers have learned to run
higher levels of turnover on lower levels of short-term
finance by much more rigorous attention to stocks, debtors
and creditors.
Technology has helped both in computerized stock control
and in the use of electronic cash management products
offered by the banks. The new techniques have sometimes
tended to favor big companies over small ones. Powerful
manufacturers and retail groups have learned to extract
longer credit terms from smaller suppliers who depend on
them for orders. At the most sophisticated level, just-in-time
components and stock delivery has tended to shift the
financing requirement down the chain of suppliers, forcing
each participant to re-examine his modus operandi.
One entrepreneur who felt this squeeze IS Quinton
Cornforth, who runs Bodybits, a chain of discount body-
panel stores in the Midlands:
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"Yes, we're much better at managing our stock and our
cash flow than we used to be and we've reduced our
borrowings enormously. But our exposure to debtors
has gone up by 300/0 because all our big customers are
asking for longer credit terms. In some ways, the trend
has gone far: maybe we're all spending too many hours
checking stock controls and chasing debtors to keep
our overdrafts to a minimum."
But most post-recession entrepreneurs agree that is well
worth the headaches to keep borrowing to a minimum.
Reflex Magnetics is a successful computer software maker
and furniture irnp or ter in Kilburn, northwest London. Its
Managing Director, John Buckle, says:
"I've always tried to keep my bank debt well under
control and I've never had any grief from them .
Gearing ratios as such don't really concern me at all,
but I'm constantly watching three figures which give
me an o v er vi ew of the net trading position, the
overdraft, what I owe suppliers and what my
customers owe me . If the pattern looks positive then
I'm prepared to look at new investments."
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After a faltering start to the recovery, new capital is at last
a live possibility again for many British companies.
Jennings of NatWest has observed a real improvement In
confidence, particularly among medium-sized businesses In
the manufacturing sector, since April 1994.
Bruce Robinson, Executive Director of Arbuthnot Latham,
confirms the picture:
"Investment in capital goods is certainly picking up,
often driven by advances in technology rather than
market expansion. Companies which haven't invested
seriously for three to four years - in the printing
industry, for instance - have fallen behind the game.
They've survived this far, but they've got to start
investing in new-generation equipment if they want to
be really competitive."
In the new mood of realism, borrowing demand is likely to
be seen first in the safety sectors, where entrepreneurs are
able to believe in their own business plans, rather than in
the more speculative sectors. The 1980s view that any
business should gear up for expansion if it has room in its
balance sheet now counts as a flat-earth theory of corporate
finance.
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Similarly, the standard sectoral gearing ratios which credit
analysts looked for in earlier business cycles are for the
time being much less useful benchmarks.
Latham says the following :
"all well-run businesses, whatever their sector, are
now finding ways of running themsel ves on lower
levels of debt , but those which are lending the
recovery are likely to gear up ahead of those which
are traditionally heavier borrowers."
Credit analysts will have to re-write their own rules,
concentrating less on the bald figures of the balance sheet
and more on the realities of cash flow and the
persuasiveness of future business plans . There IS, of course ,
another side to the story.
Demand for borrowing may be under control, but what of
supply? In the last boom it was undeniably true that banks
poured fuel onto the flames by their very aggressive lending
policies, driven by the need to fill their own balance sheets
in order to show an adequate return on capital.
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More recently, the talk has been of a "flight to qualify" and
as Martin Taylor of Barclays told Management Today
(November 1994) a willingness to shrink the lending
business In order to stay within acceptable parameters of
risk.
But the willingness of the wider corporate lending market to
take such a radically sensible view is called into question by
a new survey by the Bank Relationship Consulting (BRC).
Of the 139 banks polled, 68% expected to be growing their
loan books in a year's time : of those , three-quarters foresaw
a growth rate of more than 5% and 17 of them were looking
for growth of more than 15 % . The survey of corporate
borrowing intentions makes these ambitions look wildly
unrealistic: one third of companies were planning to
increase their bank debt next year, but another quarter were
still planning to reduce it.
Even worse news for the lenders is that many c omp an res will
meet their new funding requ irements from sources other than
banks - the buzz word is "disintermediation ."
In the BRC survey, bank debt emerges as a low choice ,
behind private placement , leasing and bonds , with many of
the largest companies planning to switch out of bank debt to
the advantage of these other markets.
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A vivid example of this trend is Guinness, which reduced
bank borrowings as a proportion of total debt from 91 % in
1987 to 15% in 1993 . The NatWest's latest quarterly survey
of companies with less than £ 130 million turnover also finds
many of them expecting to borrow from non-bank sources ,
or use more trade credit, or seek access to venture capital ,
as alternati ves to borrowing from their banks.
This yawnm g discrepancy between demand and supply can
only lead in one direction: towards a cutting of margins, a
relaxation of gearing and other covenants and a quiet
bending of quality parameters on the part of bankers.
The favored recipients of the banks' marketing attentions
according to the BBC , will be the food, utilities , chemicals ,
machinery and retail sectors. Anything property-related (or
connected with the public sector - NHS trusts and local
authorities , for example) will continue to be left out in the
cold. But perhaps not for long , as the credit cycle begins to
gather fresh momentum .
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"The speed of change in the banks' attitudes has really
surprised us this year," says Michael Bryant, Deputy
Treasurer of GKN . "It's the exact reverse of the
situation just a few years ago when companies needed
the money and the banks were walking away. Now
we're liquid and they're beginning to fall over
themselves to lend again. We're almost a's selective in
who we're prepared to borrow from as they used to be
in assessing us."
One smaller factory owner puts it even more succinctly:
"I may have tended to err on the side of safety, but
I'm bloody glad that I did. Experience says that the
one time you shouldn't be gear m g up is when the
banks start telling you it's a good idea."
3.2.1 Cost of Equity Capital Redefined
The Modigliani and Miller theory of corporate finance has
been subjected to considerable debate and interest for over
30 years. Today it is the dominant theory in the field. The
following highlights an intuitively unappealing implication
of the Modigliani and Miller model that has remained
unnoticed or at least has not received due attention . An
alternative definition of the cost of equity is presented that
does not have this drawback.
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Modigliani and Miller revolutionized corporate finance . The
idea presented in their major articles (1958 , 1963 , 1966 )
have become central to the capital structure and cost of
capital theories.
The following highlights a troublesome property implicated
in the Modigliani and Miller theory and proposes a new
approach that offers a satisfactory solution to this trouble
spot.
The basic assumption of the original Modigliani and Miller
paper (perfect capital markets , rational investor behavior , no
tax differentials , and the implication of no bankruptcy costs)
are retained.
According to Modigliani and Miller , the value of a levered
firm (V[sub L]) with a permanent level of debt (D) in its
cap ital structure is gi ven by:
(1) V[sub L] - V[sub D] + tauD = (1 - tau)E(X)/rho + tauR /
r
where:
V[sub D] = The value of an unlevered firm',
tau = The corporate tax rate;
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E(X) = The expected level of average annual carm n g s
generated by the asset of the fir m ;
lip = The market capitalization rate for an unlevered firm In
the firm's risk c lass ;
r = The rate of Interest, assumed to be constant and
independent of the size of debt; and
R = The size of the interest bill = rD
Further, the value of a firm naturally must be equal to the
sum of the values of equity (S) and debt (D), so that :
(2) V[sub L] = S + D
The line of reasoning leading to the central formula of the
Modigliani and Miller theory is broadly as follows. The
after tax return (earnings after interest and taxes, plus
interest), denoted by the random variable X[sup tau], can be
expressed as:
(3) x[sup tau] = (1 - tau)(X - R) + R = (1 - tau)X + tauR
Modigliani and Miller (1963) argue that from the investor's
point of view, the long-run average stream of after tax
returns appears as a sum of two components : an uncertain
stream, (1- tau)X, and a sure stream, tauR.
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This suggests that the equilibrium market value of the
combined stream can be found by capitalizing each
component separately .
The Inconsistency Implication in the Modigliani and
Miller Model
The cost of equity capital , i[sup *], is defined as the rate of
return required on a firm's equity by the market. In the
Modigliani and Miller framework, i[sup *] can be derived as
follows. Utilizing (3):
(4) E(X[sup tau]) - tauR = (l-tau)E(X).
Therefore , equation (1) can be expressed equivalently as :
(5) V[sub L] = E(X[sup tau]) - tauR / rho + tauD = E(X[sup
tau] - taurD + rhotauD / rho = E(X[sup tau]) + tau(rho - r)D
/ rho .
X[suptau] also can be considered to consist of the following
two streams (see equation (3») :
(;tll([U ate School of Business 64
MBA Research Dissertation, Capital Structure
• The net profit after interest and taxes ac cru in g to
common shareholder. Deducting from e arn m gs
before interest and taxes, (EBIT), X, the amounts of
taxes, (X-R)tau , and interest charges, R, yields the
net profit, pi, which belongs to the shareholders:
(6) pi = X - (X - R)tau - R = (l-tau)(X-R)o
The expected size of the annual profit stream will be:
(7) E(pi) = (l-tau)[E(X) - R] 0
• The second part of X[sup tau] IS the amount of interest
charges, R = r D.
The value of the firm can now be expressed as:
(8) V[sub L] = E(pi) + rD + tau (rho - r)D / rho ,
and the value of equity is:
(9) S = V[sub L] - D = E(pi) + rD + tau(rho-r)D - rhoD / rho
= E(pi) - (l-tau)(rho - r)D / rho
whereby :
(10) rho = E(pi) / S - (l-tau)(rho - r)D / S.
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As growth is excluded from the model, the expected rate of
return to the shareholders (cost of equity), i[sup *], IS
obtained directly by dividing the expected net profit by the
market value of equity (e.g. Hamada, 1969; Rubinstein,
1973, and Copeland and Weston, 1998). Consequently,
re arran gm g equation (10) yields the Modigliani and Miller
(1963) expression of i[sup *]:
(11) I[sup *] = E(pi) / S = rho + (l-tau)(rho-r)D/S.
One can argue, however, that it is basically the required rate
of return, i[sup ], that determines S in the market, not vice
versa. Thus, a more specific expression for i[sup] is needed
than is provided by equation (11) above.
Although not grve n by Modigliani and Miller, this can be
accomplished in the Modigliani and Miller framework as
follows.
Based on equations (1) and (2), the value of equity, S, can
be written as:
(12) S = V[sub L] - D = (1 - tau)E(X) / rho + tauR / r-R / r =
(1 - tau)E(X) / rho - (1 - tau)R / r.
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By noting that the expected net profit to the shareholders IS
E(pi) = (l-tau)(E(X) R), i[sup *] can be expressed as:






tau = 0 or, alternatively, tau = .5 0 .
Table I shows how increasing leverage affects key valuation
variables in the Modigliani and Miller framework . Figures
for the following variables are tabulated:
• Expected annual earnings, E(X);
• The assumed amounts of interest charges, R;
• Required rate of return on equity i[sup *], obtained from
equation (13); I
• The value of the whole firm, V (from equation (1»);
• The amounts of debt, D (=R/r);
• The value of equity, S (given, e.g., by S = E(pi)/i[sup *],
by equation (9), or, simply, S = V - D);
fir.duate School of Business 67
MBA Research Dissertation, Cap ital Structure
• Net profits to common shareho lders after intere st a nd
taxes , E (p i) = (l-tau )( E(X ) - R ) .
The tax rate is assumed to be zero In table 1 . Table 2 i s
based on otherwise identical assumptions except that the tax
rate is 50 percent (tau = .50 ) .
Table 1 shows that in the absence of ta xes , the value of the
firm (v) does not depend on leverage . With Ta xe s , the va lue
of the firm increases due to the tax saving induced by
le verage. Introducing taxation does not cause differences in
the rates of return for stockholders , if leverage is measured
In terms of total earnings and interest payments . (Note that
if leverage is measured in terms of market v a lu e s (fo r
instance by D/S) , the i * - va lue s wo u ld diffe r. ) And while
the tax shield increases the value of the firm with taxation ,
it does not affect the rate of return on common stock , i * .
Table 1
Impact of Increasing Le verage ( tau = .0)
E(X) R i[sup *] V D 5 E(pi)
1000 0 0.1 10000 0 10000 1000
1000 100 0.113 10000 2000 8000 900
1000 200 0.113 10000 4000 6000 800
1000 300 0.175 10000 6000 4000 700
1000 400 0.3 10000 8000 2000 600
1000 500 infinity 10000 10000 0 500
1000 600 neg. 10000 12000 -2000 400
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Table 2
Impact of Increasing Leverage (tau = .50)
1000 0 0.1 5000 0 5000 500
1000 100 0.113 600 2000 4000 450
1000 200 0.113 7000 4000 3000 400
1000 300 0.175 8000 6000 2000 350
1000 400 0.3 9000 8000 1000 300
1000 500 infinity 10000 10000 0 250
1000 600 neg. 11000 12000 -1000 200
The troublesome aspect of the two tables is that the value of
equity becomes zero in both cases when the interest bill (R)
is only half of the total earnings . The Modigliani and Miller
theory causes the value of equity to become worthless too
soon. (2) (The figures for the example are taken from
Modigliani and Miller (1958 , p. 271 , footnote 12) , where
they restricted the illustration to a single case in which R =
200, implying i* = .133.)
If the figures in Table 2 are in millions of dollars, the share
of this firm , which IS expected to earn $250 ,000 ,000
annually, are worthless.
Note that a shareholder has limited liability . In the worst
possible case of bankruptcy , the shareholder will receive
nothing. The shareholder, however , does not have to pay any
of the firm's losses or costs associated with bankruptcy .
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The reason for the inconsistency in the Modigliani and
Miller model becomes evident if equation (13) is examined .
The equity becomes zero (and i* infinite) when:
(E(x) / rho) - (R / r) = 0 or (14) ;
(E(X)) / (rho = (R / r).
Because p is expected to exceed the risk free rate R, both
sides of equation (14) become equal before E(X) - R. How
m uch before depends on the relation of p to r.
Thus, one can argue that the model does not g ive realistic
solutions . (Even the well-known extreme corner solution,
which suggests that a firm should have nearly 100% debt,
occurs when the firm may have normal levels of R/E(X).)
The proposed new approach, (The model for the valuation of
the firm) consider the expected earnings after taxes , X[sup
tau], which is the sum E(pi) + R . This can be expressed , as
already noted in equation (3) , as :
(15) E(pi) + R = (l-tau)E(X) + tauR = (l-tau)(X) - R) + R.
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To obtain the value of debt capital , the amount of interest
charges, R, is discounted at the market determined rate of
interest for the firm, r[sub r] . Hence , D = R/r[sub r] (i .e . ,
perpetual risky debt is assumed . The amount of interest
payments is assumed to be fixed , however, so that R can be
considered a constant). The remaining part of the earnings
stream after taxes belongs to the shareholders and should be
discounted at the appropriate market determined rate , i[sup
*]. The formula for the value of the firm becomes:
(16) V[sub L] = S + D = (1 - tau)(E(X) - R) / i[sup *] +
R/r[sub r],
but this is exactly the same as the formula under the
traditional view strongly criticized by Modigliani and Miller
(1958). But the traditionalists assumed that i[sup *] is
practically constant, at least up to some conventional level
of leverage, then rises rapidly.
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Some share the opinion that there is nothing wrong in
equation (16) as such . Instead, the key to valuation lie s in
the capitalized rate, i .e., how the market required rate of
return, i[sup *] , is determined by the investors in common
stock. (Besides, the Modigliani and Miller model also can be
expressed so that it is equivalent in appearance to equation
(16).) The difference between the traditional view, the
Modigliani and Miller theory, and the approach to be
presented below are only due to differences in i[sup *].
The starting point of the proposed new approach is based on
the treatment of risk by Modigliani and Miller (1963). They
showed how the distribution of after tax earnings is affected
by leverage. Their analysis proceeds basically as follows :
X is the (long run average) earning before interest and taxes
generated by the currently owned assets of a given firm in
some stated risk class, k. From the definition of risk class,
[4] it follows that X can be expressed in the form E(X)Z,
where E(X) is the expected value of X and the random
variable Z = X/E(X), having the same value for all value for
all firms in class k, is a drawing from distribution, say f[sub
k](Z). Hence, the random variable X[sup tau], measuring the
after tax return, can be expressed as:
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(17) X[sup tau] = (l-tau)(X-R) +R = (L - tau)X + tauR = (1 -
tau)E(X)Z + tauR.
Cost of Equity Capital for an Dnlevered firm.
(s ystematic risk not cons idere d)
Define the cost of capital for an unlevered company to be
equal to the risk free rate plus a premium paid on the
business risk, measured by the coefficient of variation of its
earnings (before or after taxes). In more specific terms :
i[sup *,sub D] = rf + a delta[sub x]
where :
i[sup *, sub D] = required rate of return (the subscription D
denotes an unlevered firm);
rf = risk free rate
delta [sub x] = coefficient of variation of the earnings of the
firrn ; and
a = measure of market risk aversion
If a > 0 , the market (in ves tors in the aggre gate) are ri sk
averse. If a = 0, the market can be cons idered risk neutral. If
a < 0 , the market loves risk .
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Cost of Equity Capital for a Levered Firm.
(systematic risk not considered)
Leverage intensifies the variability of the earnm gs stream
accruing to shareholders. The additional variability caused
by leverage, called financial risk, increases total risk. The
next step in determining the required rate of return is to see
how the variability of after tax net profits increases with
leverage.
Net profit after interest and taxes (pi) is equal to X( 1 - tau)
- R + tauR . In accordance with equation (17):
pi = (l-tau)X - R + tauR = (l-tau)E(X)Z - R + tauR
It is important to note that i[sup *]L becomes infinite
(equity value becomes zero) only when the interest payment
equal expected earnt n g s before interest and taxes. The
Modigliani and Miller theory , In contrast , implicitly
assumes that the value of equity becomes zero before (and
sometimes well before) the interest payments equal the
expected earnings .
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Cost of Equity Capital under the Proposed New Approach .
(systematic risk considered)
The analysis to this point has abstracted from portfolio
considerations. Investors can eliminate a considerable
amount of risk by diversifying their investments . According
to the asset pricing model (CAPM), the only risk the
investors should consider is systematic risk or market risk
that cannot be diversified. According to Sharp and Cooper
(1972) ,
"the appropriate measure of risk for a security or
portfolio is the covariance of its rate of return with
that of a portfolio composed of all risky assets , each
held in proportion to its total value ."
The division of a security's total risk into systematic (non-
diversifiable) and nonsystematic (diversifiable) components
is given in the CAPM framework.
Admittedly , the CAPM approach IS concerned with returns
and variability of returns on securities, whereas the
derivation of the cost of equity capital model here is in
terms of earnings and variability of earnings of firms.
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N either the new approach nor Modigliani and Miller theory
identifie s an optimal cap ital structure . B oth imp Iy
(bankruptcy costs aside) that the firm should finance with
nearly all debt.
3.2.2 Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC)
W ACC calculations are identical for all cost of equity
models . The only variable for each WACC calculation is the
cost of equity for each model. The following formula is used
to derive the WACC : (assume no taxes)
WACC = keWe + ka We
where:
We = proportion of equity finance to total finance
W d = proportion of de bt finance to total finance
If some numbers are now put into this equation, conclusions
might be possible about the optimal debt level and therefore
the value of the firm. If it assumed that the cost of equity
capital is 20%, the cost of debt capital 100/0, and the equity
and debt weights are both 50% the overall cost of capital is
15%.
WACC = 20 x 0.5 + 10 x 0.5 = 15%
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It is further assumed that the firm is expected to generate a
perpetual annual cash flow of £ 1m , then the total value of
the firm is :
v = Cl / WACC = £lm / 0.15 = £6 .667m
This whole area of finance revolves around what happens
next, that is , when the proportion of debt is increased . So ,
let us assume that the debt ratio is increased to 700/0 through
the substitution of debt for equity. I will consider four
possible consequences.
1. The cost of equity remains at 20%, the W ACC decreases
to 13%
2. The cost of equity capital rises due to increased financial
risk to exactly offset the effect of the lower cost of debt,
the W ACC remains constant at 15%
3. The cost of equity capital r is e s , but this does not
completely offset all the benefits of the lower cost of debt
capital. Let us assume that equity holders demand a return
of 22% return at a 70% gearing level , WACC decreases to
13 .6%. In this case the increase of debt manages to reduce
the overall cost of capital and thus increase the value of
the firm and shareholders wealth.
v = £lm / 0.136 = £7.35m
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4. The cost of equity rises to more than offset the effect of
the lower cost of debt. Here the equity holders are
demanding much higher returns as compensation for the
additional volatility and risk of liquidation. Let us assume
that a return of 40% is required by shareholders.
WACC = 19%
V = £5.26m
3 .2 .3 WACC - The correct discount rate
Two discount cash flow techniques are cited In The
Appraisal of Real Estate. In one , the market value estimate
is derived by discounting the net cash flows by a single rate .
In the other , it is derived by discounting the equity cash
flows by the equity yield rate and adding the present value
of debt . The following demonstrates why the W ACC is the
theoretically correct discount rate to apply to the pre-
finance cash flows .
Assume that a client requests an estimate of market value
for an income-producing property. A ten-year discounted
cash flow (DCF) analysis is performed. The reversion occurs
at the end of the tenth year and is predicated on the 11 th
year net operating income (NOI) being capitalized at 8%.
Sales commissions of 4% are deducted from the gross
reversion to yield the net sales proceeds.
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The basic assumptions of DCF analysis include first-year
revenue of $1,000,000 and expenses of $150,000 . Inflation
is estimated at 5% per year , vacancy and collection loss is
estimated at 8% per year.
Market research shows that typical loan terms include 10%
interest, a 70% loan-to-value ratio, and a 30-year
amortization schedule (annual payments). Equity investors,
given these debt financing terms and the anticipated risk of

















In the DCF model for estimating market value in real estate,
the total value of the project is estimated by discounting the
net cash flows and the net sales proceeds by the WACC at
the end of the holding period . Then , if the ap prai ser wishes ,
equity value can be estimated by subtracting the present
value of the debt from the total project value . According to
Rappaport:
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"The appropriate rate for discounting the company's
cash flow stream IS the weighted average of the costs
of debt and equity capital. The cost of capital rate
incorporates the returns demanded by both debt
holders and shareholders because pre-interest cash
flows are discounted, that is, cash flows on which
both debt holders and shareholders have claim. The
appropriate cost of capital IS therefore one that
considers the claim of each group in proportion to its
targeted relative capital contribution. The cash flows
discounted by the cost of capital yields corporate
value, and then debt is deducted to obtain shareholder
value. "
The correct discount rate for a real estate market-value DCF
analysis is the pre-tax WACC as applied to pre-finance cash
flows. The WACC is determined by the market; it is based
on the perceived business and financial risk of expected net
cash flows. A principle advantage of employing WACC is
that it separates the investment and finance decisions .
Conversely, by discounting each investor-specific cash flow
(i.e., debt and equity capital) by its respective costs, the
investment and finance decisions are automatically
intertwined. As long as the cost of debt and equity are held
constant over the investment term and the proportion of debt
diminishes and the proportion of equity increases, the
implicit WACC increases over the investment period.
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The implication IS that the riskiness of the project IS
increasing over the investment term . By definition, the
market-determined WACC incorporates equity investors ' and
creditors' expected returns based on anticipated risks .
Sophisticated investors employ the WACC for discounting
pre-finance cash flows. Discounting each capital source's
cash flow by its respective cost results in an incorrect value
estimate. It IS theoretically indefensible and can cause
investors to make less than optimal decisions .
3.2.4 Capital Structure Ratios
!Debt / Total Capitall
DTCi= SDi
TCi
SDi= STDi+ LTDi + PSTKi
TCi= SDi + ECi
where,
DTCi = Debt to total capital for company
BDi = Book debt for company
TCi = Total capitalization for company
STDi = Book value of debt in current liabilities for company
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L TD i = Book va lu e of long term debt fo r company
PSTKi = Book value of preferred stock for company
EC i = Equity capitalization for company
!Debt / M. V. Common Equityl
DMVEi = SDi
ECi
SDi = STDi + LTDi + PSTKi
ECi = Pix Si
where ,
DMVEi = Debt to market value of equity for company
BD i = Book debt for company
ECi = Equity capitalization for company
STDi = Book value of debt in current liabilities for company
L TD i = Book value of long term debt for company
PS TKi = Book value of preferred stock for company
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P i = Price per common share for company
Si = Common shares outstanding for company
The debt to market value of equity represents the most
recent fiscal year's total book debt divided by the most
recent month's equity capitalization .
Total equity capitalization represents the most recent
month's closing stock price multiplied by the most recently
available shares outstanding.
!Debt to Equity, Debt Ratio & Interest Coverl
Debt to Equity = Long-term loans
Shareholders Equity
Debt Ratio = Total Debt
Total Assets
Interest Cover = NOPBIT
Interest
These ratios e x arru n e the financing structure of the business.
They focus on the combination of owners' equity and outside
financing (long and short-term) used by the company .
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The debt to equity ratio has attempted to concentrate only
on long-term debt, that is debt which requires a reward in
the form of interest. The comparison is thus between long-
term loans and shareholders equity . The ratio may be
interpreted to mean that for every £ 1 of capital provided by
ordinary shareholders, "x " pence was raised through long-
term loans. This ratio is often defined differently, most
probably by comparing total debt to shareholders' equity.
Such a definition would provide little additional information
to that a lre ady avai lab Ie from an in tui ti ve in terpretati on 0 f
the de bt ratio.
Comparing only the long-term loans to shareholders'
equity provides insight into the capital structure of the
company, thus providing information which will be useful
in assessing financial risk.
The debt ratio has been defined as total debt compared to
total assets .
The interest cover ratio , often referred to as the 'times
interest earned ratio' shows the number of times which the
net profit is able to cover the interest which is due . It is
calculated before tax and interest in order to reflect the
position more accurately .
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4 Observation
The following IS data extracted from audited financials and
proj ec ti ons.
• Debt to Equity - Long-term loans
Shareholders' Equity
Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Projected Projected Projected
Audited Audited Audited Audited Audited Audited
The company has significantly reduced its levels of gearing
over the last seven years (1995-2001). This IS partly
attributable to periodic capital injection by the shareholders
into the business . All indications are that from a strategic
point of view the company is to retain this policy of
avoiding third party finance.
• Debt Ratio = Total Debt
Total Assets
Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Projected Projected Projected
Audited Audited Audited Audited Audited Audited
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The company has moved towards a policy of using less debt
to finance its assets . By comparing the two tables, it
becomes evident that the majority of debt is involved In
financing working capital.
With this policy in mind, of avoiding third party debt, I
shall evaluate the impact of the two long-term loans on the
capital structure.
This impact of long-term debt into the capital structure will
strategically change the nature of the projected debt to
equity ratio. By financing the business with more debt than
equity, I shall measure the weighted average cost of capital
(WACC), and the value of the firm (V) to determined
whether or not shareholder maximization will be achieve.
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5 Evaluation
ICurrent Scenario :1
WACC = 25% x 0.94 + 16% x 0.06 = 24.46%
V = R6'132 '461
(proposed Scenario 1 :1 (Lloyds TSB - UK)
WACC = 29% x 0.3 + 22% x 0.7 = 24.1%
V = R6'224'066
(proposed Scenario 2 :1 (Investee Bank - SA)
WACC = 24% x 0.3 + 21% x 0.7 = 21.9%
V = R6'849'315
Scenario 2 is the preferred strategy towards m ax nru z m g
shareholder wealth.
Based on the evaluation, I conclude that the null
hypothesis (Ho) is rejected and the alternative (HI)
hypothesis is accepted.
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Throughout the literature review we get a very distinct
pattern developing from Modigliani and Miller's classical
theory on capital structure to current world best practices
currently being employed.
This pattern moves from higher to lower financial geanng
levels throughout the decades . The 1980s view was that any
business should gear up for expansion if it had room in its
balance sheet now counts as a flat-earth theory of corporate
finance .
There are numerous reasons for this pattern . Listed , are
some of the key driving factors , resulting in the reduced
levels of financial gearing , extracted from the literature
review.
• Management's VIew about changes In the firms prospects
for the future
• Increased economic uncertainty about the future
• Rapidly changing environments
• Maintaining a solid credit rating
• Increased understanding of financial distress
• The business specific issues (Trade-off Theory)
• The environment in which these forces operate
• The ability / inability to sustain stable cash flows
• A safety first approach
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• Finding new ways of running business on lower levels of
debt
In conclusion, it is interesting to note that this worldwide
trend has been 'inline' with my business and its policy
towards lower financial gear i n g . (Refer to audited
financials)
In the past we have found ways of running our business on
lower levels of debt. Our view of risk (interest rate, foreign
exchange and inflation) has erred on the conservative but it
has been well worth the headaches to keep borrowings to a
rmmmum.
It was decided by the Directors at the Annual General
Meeting, dated zs" January, 2001, that the company
would maintain its current policy of 6% financial
gearing.
Despite Scenario 2 proving to reduce the W ACC and
therefore maximize shareholders wealth and company value,
we the Directors, have decided against this gearing strategy.
The current policy of 6% financial gear i n g will
unchanged.
wr.duate School of Business
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